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Complementary or Competing Freedoms: 
Government Officials, Religious Freedom,
and LGBTQ Rights*
Frank S. Ravitch**
I. INTRODUCTION
The story of Clerk Kim Davis from Rowan County, Kentucky, made 
headlines across the country. Almost everyone is familiar with her refusal 
to provide marriage licenses after the United States Supreme Court held that 
same-sex marriage is a fundamental right that cannot be denied to same-sex 
couples.1 Ironically, however, her case may have done more to obfuscate 
the issue of religious accommodations for government officials than to 
enlighten people about the issue. 
This is in part because of the grandstanding that occurred in her case. 
Davis and her attorneys turned her into a cause célèbre, and in the process 
made claims that turned out to be false;2 some of which did not relate 
directly to her legal arguments.3 Meanwhile, around the country, other 
government employees have sought accommodation without becoming 
cause célèbres. These cases raise many questions that will be addressed in 
this Essay. 
Must religious freedom claims by government officials be 
accommodated when the requested accommodation is to not perform duties 
for which the official was elected or hired? If such accommodations are not 
mandatory, should they be given? And if so, under what circumstances? 
Does the availability of other officials who can perform the duties make a 
difference? What about the argument that dignitary harm results when a 
government official requests that someone else perform her duties? Does 
media attention figure into the question of dignitary harm? 
*  This essay is adapted from a Chapter in FRANK S. RAVITCH, FREEDOM’S EDGE: RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM, SEXUAL FREEDOM, AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICA (forthcoming 2016). 
          **  Professor of Law and Walter H. Stowers Chair in Law & Religion, Director, Kyoto Japan 
Program, Michigan State University College of Law. The author would like to thank the participants in 
the FIU Law Review’s Religion and the Law Symposium for helpful comments and questions and the 
excellent staff of the FIU Law Review for the amazing organization and quality of the symposium. 
1  Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
2 Dominic Holden, Kim Davis’s Lawyers Have Said Things that Are Literally Unbelievable,
BUZZFEED NEWS (Oct. 14, 2015, 3:57 PM), www.buzzfeed.com/dominicholden/kim-daviss-lawyers-
have-said-things-that-are-literally-unbel#.vcmdAkxE4.
3 Id.
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As will be seen, the biggest problem with Kim Davis’ claim was not 
her personal refusal to issue marriage licenses, but rather her refusal 
initially to allow anyone in her office to do so. There is a fundamental 
difference between a government official seeking accommodation and an 
official seeking to keep others, even those whom she supervises, from 
following the law. Additionally, the media firestorm her situation 
generated––and which she helped to foster––raises additional questions that 
may not be present when a county clerk simply asks that others in her office 
issue same-sex marriage licenses. 
This Essay is adapted from a key chapter in a forthcoming book, 
Freedom’s Edge: Religious Freedom, Sexual Freedom, and the Future of 
America.4 In the book, I argue that Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender 
and Queer (LGBTQ) rights, reproductive rights, and religious freedom 
share common themes and common ground. Moreover, I argue that the 
supposed tension between these freedoms does not exist in most religious 
freedom claims, such as situations where Native Americans seek to 
maintain rituals and practices that conflict with federal or state law, but 
have no direct impact on anyone other than the persons or tribes seeking 
accommodation. Significantly, the book focuses heavily on those situations 
where conflict or tension does exist, suggesting that these situations should 
be resolved in a manner that minimizes harms and burdens on all sides.5
The county clerk/government official context provides an excellent example 
of how these harms and burdens can be minimized. This Essay does not 
address the broader issue of why we should maximize freedom and 
minimize burdens on all sides, but it does provide proof that maximizing 
freedom and minimizing burdens can be achieved even in a highly 
contested context. 
II. ISSUES WITH ACCOMMODATING GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
Should we accommodate government officials and employees who 
seek religious exemptions in cases involving sexual freedom? The answer is 
a qualified “yes.” Of course, the details matter. In some situations, a balance 
can be reached that will maximize protection for sexual freedom while 
allowing religious accommodation of government employees. In states that 
have Religious Freedom Restoration Acts (RFRA), or other laws that 
protect the religious freedom of government officials, the boundaries drawn 
would determine when accommodation is mandatory. In all other states, the 
boundaries drawn would determine when permissive accommodations are 
4  FRANK S. RAVITCH, FREEDOM’S EDGE: RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, SEXUAL FREEDOM, AND THE 
FUTURE OF AMERICA (forthcoming 2016). 
5 Id.
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allowed if the relevant government entity seeks to accommodate.6
For the reasons explained in Freedom’s Edge,7 I think 
accommodations should be given except when doing so will impose a direct 
and meaningful harm on others. Of course, the question of what 
accommodations will result in direct and meaningful harm raises a number 
of unique problems when those seeking accommodation are government 
officials. As a matter of law there is no duty to accommodate unless a 
RFRA or other law requires doing so.8 Thus, my argument is not that 
government entities must accommodate in the absence of a legal 
requirement to do so, but rather that they should accommodate regardless of 
whether there is a legal mandate to do so when doing so will not result in 
direct and meaningful harm to others.9 On the flip side, even in states with 
RFRAs, or other relevant laws that apply to government officials or 
employees, accommodation may not be required unless certain parameters 
are met.10 These parameters are discussed in detail in the next section. First, 
some of the specific issues raised in the context of accommodating 
government officials and employees must be addressed. 
A number of factors make situations involving government officials 
especially complex. Government officials are elected or hired to serve the 
public generally, so when they seek an exemption to refuse service to a 
specific group within the public––especially in relation to a right 
recognized by the United States Supreme Court––alarm bells should sound. 
For example, if a government official refused to grant marriage licenses to 
interracial couples based on a religious argument, no court would allow 
such an injustice to stand.11 Why should the situation be any different when 
a government official asserts a religious objection to issuing same-sex 
marriage licenses? 
First, there is an analogy to be made on the basic rights. The 
Obergefell Court did rely—and I would assert correctly so—in part on 
6 See Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990) (exemptions to 
generally applicable laws are not required by the Free Exercise Clause, but government entities are free 
to give accommodations to generally applicable laws if they choose to do so). 
7 See RAVITCH, supra note 4, at chs. 1–3. 
8 Smith, 494 U.S. at 872 (no duty to provide exemptions to generally applicable laws under the 
Free Exercise Clause). 
9 See RAVITCH, supra note 4, at chs. 1–2. 
10 See infra Part III. 
11  In fact, in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), the state of Virginia relied in part on religious 
arguments and the Court resoundingly rejected those arguments as being based on a more general theme 
of racial inferiority (along with the state’s other arguments). As will be discussed below, Loving and the 
unconstitutionality of anti-miscegenation laws generally, while helpful in demonstrating the 
constitutional right to same-sex marriage, are not as helpful in addressing claims for religious 
exemptions from supporting same-sex marriage because of significant historical and theological 
differences.
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Loving v. Virginia to support its holding that denying the right to same-sex 
marriage violates the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.12 Yet, this analogy does not address the question of 
religious accommodations. The nature and history of religious objections to 
interracial marriages and the nature and history of religious objection to 
same-sex marriage are quite different.13 Second, religious objections to 
interracial marriage were directly connected to a broader system of 
racism,14 while religious objections to same-sex marriage are often limited 
to the issue of marriage itself.15 In fact, this is reflected directly in the 
opinions finding a constitutional right to interracial marriage and to same-
sex marriage. In Loving v. Virginia,16 the case in which the United States 
Supreme Court held that anti-miscegenation laws (laws that prohibited 
interracial marriage) are unconstitutional, the Court wrote: “The fact that 
Virginia prohibits only interracial marriages involving white persons 
demonstrates that the racial classifications must stand on their own 
justification, as measures designed to maintain white supremacy.”17 Yet, in 
Obergefell v. Hodges,18 the case in which the Court held there is a 
constitutional right to same-sex marriage, the Court specifically noted: 
Finally, it must be emphasized that religions, and those who adhere to 
religious doctrines, may continue to advocate with utmost, sincere 
conviction that, by divine precepts, same-sex marriage should not be 
condoned. The First Amendment ensures that religious organizations 
and persons are given proper protection as they seek to teach the 
principles that are so fulfilling and so central to their lives and faiths, 
and to their deep aspirations to continue the family structure they have 
long revered.19
There are certainly people who object to same-sex marriage based on 
bigotry and not religious principal. If any of these people were government 
12  Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2598–99, 2602–04 (2015). 
13  SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: EMERGING CONFLICTS (Douglas Laycock et 
al. eds., 2008); Kent Greenawalt, Religious Toleration and Claims of Conscience, 28 J.L. & POL. 91, 
114 (2013); Douglas Laycock, Sex, Atheism, and the Free Exercise of Religion, 88 U. DET. MERCY L.
REV. 407 (2011). But see James M. Oleske, Jr., The Evolution of Accommodation: Comparing the 
Unequal Treatment of Religious Objections to Interracial and Same-Sex Marriages, 50 HARV. CIV.
RTS.-CIV. LIB. L. REV. 99 (2015) (arguing that the differences between religious objections to same-sex 
marriage and interracial marriage have been overblown). 
14 Loving, 388 U.S. at 11. 
15  Kent Greenawalt, Religious Toleration and Claims of Conscience, 28 J.L. & POL. 91, 111–14 
(2013).
16  388 U.S. at 1. 
17 Id. at 11. 
18  135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
19 Id. at 2607. 
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officials and asserted a religious objection to issuing same-sex marriage 
licenses based on the argument that members of the LGBTQ community are 
inferior or should not interact with the heterosexual community on an equal 
basis, the exemption should be denied.20 This is because the level of harm 
caused by granting an exemption in these circumstances would far 
outweigh the government official’s religious freedom interest. It is not 
because the request for an exemption is religiously based. 
The above are not the only concern with granting exemptions to 
government officials and employees. Two other factors are highly 
relevant—the proper role of government officials and the Establishment 
Clause. First, the person seeking the exemption is a government official. 
Government officials are elected or hired to serve the public generally. 
Allowing them to pick and choose who they will serve could set a 
dangerous precedent.21 Should a devout Christian government official who 
believes that she can only interact with Christians and that refuses to serve 
Jewish, Muslim, Buddhist, and Atheist citizens be accommodated? What 
about an extremely devout Wahhabi Muslim man who objects to interacting 
with female citizens? 
The answer is “no,” because the accommodations would prevent the 
official from doing his job for a large percentage of the public; so while the 
government could give a permissive accommodation, there are good 
reasons why it shouldn’t. How can we determine the line of demarcation 
between these situations and a clerk who seeks an accommodation to not 
issue same-sex marriage licenses? The key is in the parameters discussed in 
the next section. Unless the person’s main duty is issuing marriage licenses, 
they can fulfill their other duties. And so long as someone else can issue the 
licenses without any inconvenience to any citizens, the situation is quite 
different. The former situations are more akin to someone who refuses to 
20 See, e.g., United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2689 (2013) (holding DOMA 
unconstitutional in part because it disparaged same-sex couples who could legally marry in one state 
from affirming “their commitment to one another before their . . . community”); Romer v. Evans, 517 
U.S. 620 (1996) (invalidating Colorado constitutional amendment that prevented any government entity 
within the state from protecting people from discrimination based on sexual orientation because the 
basis for the proposed amendment was discriminatory). 
21  Miller v. Davis, Civ. Action No. 15-44-DLB, 2015 WL 4866729 (E.D. Ky. Aug. 12, 2015). 
While Mary Ann Case and I disagree on the possibility of finding workable accommodations that 
adequately protect rights on both sides of the debate, she pointed out this concern in her talk at the 
symposium and in her earlier article. See Mary Ann Case, Why “Live-And-Let-Live” Is Not a Viable 
Solution to the Difficult Problems of Religious Accommodations in the Age of Sexual Civil Rights, 88 S.
CAL. L. REV. 463 (2015) (concerned about the slippery slope accommodation claims will take in 
derogation of the rights of others). In the context of accommodating government employees, I agree 
with her concern and that of Judge Bunning in the Davis case, about setting a dangerous precedent, but 
as explained infra at Part III, with proper parameters these claims can be workable. The parameters are 
based, in part, on Judge Bunnings careful analysis in Miller v. Davis.
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serve any LGBTQ citizens. The government has the strongest interest in not 
accommodating such a person.22
Next, accommodating government officials might raise Establishment 
Clause concerns that are not raised in other accommodation contexts.23 For 
example, wouldn’t accommodating a government official who refuses to 
issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples or who refuses to perform a 
same-sex civil ceremony be a violation of the Establishment Clause? The 
short answer is “no,” but with one major exception discussed below. In 
Employment Division v. Smith,24 the Supreme Court specifically held that 
permissive accommodations are allowed.25 In Cutter v. Wilkinson,26 the 
Supreme Court specifically addressed this issue and held that application of 
the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), a 
statute that applies the same—or perhaps an even more stringent level of 
protection—than RFRA,27 does not violate the Establishment Clause.28
The major exception occurs when a government endorses or advances 
religion through the accommodation. This can happen when states pass 
laws that are designed to promote religion rather than simply accommodate 
it.29 For example, if a state designs a law to favor specific religious values 
or passes a law that favors those values in a manner that could harm the 
rights of others, there is a significant likelihood of an Establishment Clause 
violation.30 This could happen if a law was passed that mandated 
accommodation for government employees, but did nothing to protect the 
rights of same-sex couples in areas where no government employee is 
available to give a marriage license or perform a civil ceremony.31 This 
could also happen if a state ended all civil ceremonies and made no 
allowance for other non-religious means of a marriage, therefore only 
allowing marriages to be validated through a religious entity.32
22 See supra notes 12–20, and accompanying text. 
23 Frederick Mark Gedicks & Rebecca G. Van Tassell, RFRA Exemptions from the Contraception 
Mandate: An Unconstitutional Accommodation of Religion, 49 HARV. CIV. RTS.-CIV. LIB. L. REV. 343 
(2014).
24  494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
25 Id. at 890. 
26  544 U.S. 709 (2005). 
27  Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2761–62 (2014) (RLUIPA altered RFRA to expand 
its focus beyond pre-Smith law). But see Frank S. Ravitch, Be Careful What You Wish for: Why Hobby 
Lobby Weakens Religious Freedom, 2016 B.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) (arguing that the Hobby
Lobby Court was wrong about the impact of RLUIPA on RFRA). 
28 Cutter, 544 U.S. at 719–26. 
29 Cf. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987). 
30  Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985). 
31  Miller v. Davis, Civ. Action No. 15-44-DLB, 2015 WL 4866729 (E.D. Ky. Aug. 12, 2015). 
32  This has not happened in any state, but legislation has been proposed in Alabama that would 
eliminate the requirement for marriage licenses, but this bill would change the process so that couples 
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Two states have already provided legal models for accommodating 
religious government employees without harming the rights of same-sex 
couples. Both North Carolina and Utah have passed laws that require 
someone be available to grant marriage licenses and perform same-sex civil 
ceremonies at the same times they are available to opposite-sex couples, 
while also allowing for religious accommodations for government 
employees.33 These laws are not perfect, and some of the advocates of these 
bills seemed more concerned with protecting religious claims than with 
compromise, but the resulting laws protect the right of same-sex couples to 
get marriage licenses without delay or a lowering of available services. 
Neither law addresses parameter five below, but both do engage in 
balancing rights in a manner that should not violate the Establishment 
Clause. 
III. THE PARAMETERS NECESSARY FOR ACCOMMODATING GOVERNMENT
OFFICIALS WITHOUT MATERIALLY HARMING THE RIGHTS OF OTHERS
In this section I will set forth, and then explain, the basic parameters 
necessary to accommodate government officials and employees without 
imposing direct and meaningful harm on others. After that, I will look at 
two state laws, one in North Carolina and one in Utah that address these 
questions. Both of these laws address in a careful and balanced manner four 
of the five parameters I discuss. Neither law, however, addresses the fifth 
parameter. The parameters are designed to minimize harm to same-sex 
couples while protecting religious freedom. They are designed to work both 
in the RFRA and permissive accommodation contexts. 
Here are the five parameters: 
First, government officials and employees should be accommodated in 
cases where a government official seeks a religious accommodation 
and there are others who are able to fulfill the duties of that official 
without causing any delay or reduction in service to citizens, unless the 
fifth parameter below is violated. 
Second, there should be no accommodation where the only 
government official able to carry out a function, or all officials able to 
would submit a marriage contract which would then be recorded rather than the probate judge issuing a 
marriage license. Mike Cason, Bill to Eliminate Marriage Licenses Moves Closer to Passing,
ALABAMA.COM (Sept. 14, 2015), www.al.com/news/index.ssf/2015/09/bill_to_eliminate_marriage_
lic.html. While the law raises numerous practical and legal problems there is no reason to believe that 
this would lead to a requirement of a marriage ceremony that could only be performed by a religious 
entity.
33  N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 51-5.5, 7A-292(b) (2015); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 17-20-4, 30-1-6, 63G-
20-101, et seq. (West 2015). 
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carry out the function, seek accommodation to avoid doing so. 
Moreover, under these circumstances there should be no 
accommodation even under RFRA. 
Third, accommodation should be given unless the fifth parameter is 
violated, where a government official seeks an accommodation beyond 
excusal from performing a specific duty, such as having his or her 
name removed from marriage license forms, so long as the 
accommodation would not invalidate or call into question the right or 
benefit conferred on citizens. 
Fourth, there should be no accommodation where the accommodation 
sought is an exemption from performing on an equal basis the primary 
duty the official was elected or hired to perform. 
Fifth, accommodation should be denied or revoked when a 
government official acting in his or her official capacity calls attention 
to the refusal to perform a duty, either through contacting the media or 
through direct confrontation with the citizens he or she refuses to 
serve.
The first parameter makes sense as a balance between religious 
freedom and same-sex marriage rights. So long as there is no denial, delay, 
or reduction in service, the fact that a specific official or employee does not 
issue a license or perform a civil marriage ceremony would not violate or 
infringe on the rights of any citizen. The key is that there be someone else 
who is ready, willing, and legally able to issue the license or solemnize the 
marriage. This is precisely what the North Carolina and Utah laws require.34
These laws are reasonably clear that no denial or reduction in service is 
allowed,35 but the Utah law could be improved by spelling out more clearly 
that no delay in services should be allowed.36 The North Carolina law seems 
clear on this.37
This factor is the one that most clearly works against Kim Davis. 
Having others perform the duty in question is an obvious accommodation, 
and yet one she did not seek. From the start she had at least one clerk 
willing to issue licenses,38 and subsequently all but one clerk agreed to issue 
34  N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 51-5.5(a)–(c), 7A-292(b) (2015); UTAH CODE ANN. § 17-20-4(1)-(2) 
(West 2015). 
35  N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 51-5.5(a)–(c), 7A-292(b) (2015); UTAH CODE ANN. § 17-20-4(1)-(2) 
(West 2015). 
36  This does seem implicit in Utah Code § 17-20-4(1)–(2), but it is not spelled out. Interestingly, 
Utah Code § 63G-20-101, et seq., prohibits discrimination as a result of either religion or sexuality in a 
variety of contexts. 
37  N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 51-5.5, 7A-292(b) (2015). 
38  Miller v. Davis, Civ. Action No. 15-44-DLB, 2015 WL 4866729, at *3 (E.D. Ky. Aug. 12, 
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licenses,39 yet she initially refused to allow them to do so.40 Interestingly, 
her reason for refusing this obvious accommodation was concern about 
facilitating sin by having her name on the licenses. Facilitating something 
that violates one’s deepest religious convictions is serious, but parameter 
three addresses this concern. As will be seen, she could have been 
accommodated by having her name removed from the forms, but that too 
was not adequate for her.41 If accommodation is available, but the person 
seeking accommodation refuses to accept available accommodations and 
insists on accommodations that would directly and materially have a 
negative impact on third parties, that individual cannot be accommodated. 
The second parameter is a natural corollary to the first parameter. If 
there is no one else who can issue a marriage license or perform a civil 
ceremony without delay there should be no accommodation. This could 
occur because only one person is authorized to issue the license or perform 
the ceremony, as in the case of a small county office, or it could occur 
because everyone authorized to do so seeks an exemption. The North 
Carolina and Utah laws require that someone be available to issue the 
license or perform the ceremony so that this problem is avoided. The Utah 
law expands the range of officials who can perform these duties to help 
facilitate this,42 and the North Carolina law sets up a system that could 
provide immediate backup in situations where exemptions are given.43
The one accommodation that is not available is to deny or limit access 
to marriage licenses (and by analogy civil ceremonies). This is a logical 
corollary to the Supreme Court’s decision in Obergefell,44 and a point 
specifically spelled out in Judge Bunning’s opinion in the Kim Davis case.45
Allowing such an accommodation would violate the fundamental rights of 
couples denied the licenses. The fact that the couples might go to other 
2015).
39  Miller v. Davis, Civ. Action No. 15-44-DLB, at 1 (E.D. Ky. Sept. 8, 2015), www.just security.
org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/bunning.lift_.pdf (“[F]ive of her six clerks stated under oath that they 
would comply with the Court’s Order and issue marriage licenses to all legally eligible couples.”). 
40  Davis, 2015 WL 4866729, at *3 (she was not willing to allow it after one clerk agreed to issue 
licenses).
41  Miller v. Davis, Civ. Action No. 15-44-DLB, at 1 n.1 (E.D. Ky. Sept. 8, 2015), www.
justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/bunning.lift_.pdf (“Plaintiffs marriage licenses have been 
altered so that ‘Rowan County’ rather than ‘Kim Davis’ appears on the line reserved for the name of the 
county clerk, [and] Plaintiffs have not argued that the alterations affect the validity of the licenses.”). 
42  UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 17-20-4(2), 30-1-6 (West 2015) (requiring that a county clerk or 
designee be available during business hours to solemnize a legal marriage and adding this to the list of 
those who may solemnize marriages). 
43  N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 51-5.5(a)–(c), 7A-292(b) (West 2015). 
44  Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
45 See Davis, 2015 WL 4866729, at *7–8. 
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counties does not solve this problem.46 Since there is a fundamental right to 
marriage, and that right cannot be denied to same-sex couples, it follows 
that limiting the times and places that right can be effectuated in order to 
preclude same-sex couples from receiving marriage licenses in a given 
location violates the fundamental right and denies the couple equal 
protection of the law. 
There is no constitutional basis for doing so under the Free Exercise 
Clause in this context because marriage laws are generally applicable.47
Therefore, any countervailing free exercise right would arise under a statute 
such as a RFRA, under a state constitution, or as a matter of permissible 
accommodation. The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution 
answers any doubts as to which law prevails when a federal constitutional 
right is violated by federal statute, state constitution, or state law.48 The 
right under the U.S. Constitution prevails.49 Even if this were not the case, 
the government would have a compelling interest in upholding the U.S. 
Constitution under a state RFRA, and allowing accommodation so long as 
someone can perform the relevant duties. Moreover, denying 
accommodation where someone else could not perform the relevant duties 
under state law seems narrowly tailored to meet the interest in upholding 
the U.S. Constitution. 
The third parameter is quite interesting. It raises the question of 
“facilitating evil,” which is a major focus of conscience claims generally, 
and an issue addressed in great detail in Freedom’s Edge.50 What happens 
when a county clerk or other government official does not want his or her 
name on marriage licenses issued to same sex couples? The Kim Davis case 
raised this issue. In that case, however, two things kept this issue from 
being the primary focus. 
First, the state Attorney General and the Governor51 have said that 
licenses altered by Davis to remove her name are valid under state law.52
This seems consistent with the state law governing marriage licenses,53 but 
46 Id. at *6–7. 
47 See Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
48  U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
49 Id.
50  RAVITCH, supra note 4, at ch. 3. 
51  References to the Attorney General and Governor are to those from the Beshear 
administration, which ended on December 8, 2015. The new administration has implemented some 
changes, a discussion of which is beyond the scope of this Essay. 
52  Eliana Dockterman, Kim Davis’ Lawyers Argue Altered Marriage Licenses Are Valid, TIME
(Oct. 13, 2015), http://time.com/4072544/kim-davis-marriage-licenses (noting State Attorney General 
and Governor have approved the altered licenses as valid). 
53  KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 402.100(1)(c) (West 2006) requires the use of a form prescribed by 
the state Department of Libraries and Archives, but only requires the signature of the “county clerk or
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one could read the state law to require licenses to have the clerk’s name on 
them.54 The Kentucky Governor and Attorney General’s reading seems to 
be both the better legal interpretation and the best practical approach.55
Second, Davis initially refused to allow other clerks in her office to 
issue the licenses, which made whether her name appeared on the licensees 
secondary to the question of issuing the licenses. The questions were 
certainly intertwined. The fact that Davis’ name would be on the licenses 
was one of the reasons she refused to allow others in her office to issue the 
licenses. She also initially believed that if her name were removed from the 
licenses they would be invalid, although she later changed this position.56
Davis was initially wrong on the latter point, but the reason for parameter 
number three is to assure that where a clerk is willing to allow others in her 
office to follow the law, concerns about having her name on a document 
that violates her fundamental religious tenets can be accommodated. 
The best way to approach this would be to allow just the name of the 
county, or a state office, to be on marriage licenses. This is, of course, a 
question of state law. It may be impossible to accommodate a clerk who 
wants her name removed if the state requires the name of the clerk to be on 
the license for it to be valid. If the state does not require the clerk’s name to 
be on marriage licenses, even where the practice is to include the name, an 
objecting clerk should be accommodated in taking his or her name off of 
marriage licenses, so long as it is done on all licenses and not just those for 
same-sex couples. 
The reason for allowing this accommodation, where doing so does not 
directly and materially harm others, is to protect the religious freedom of 
someone who cannot do something that violates a core tenet of their 
religion. It is important to accommodate these sorts of concerns so long as 
they can be accommodating without materially harming others; lest we 
impose our values on people with different values and traditions.57 Of 
course, the removal of the name must be applied equally to all marriage 
deputy county clerk issuing the license.” Therefore, if the state Department of Libraries and Archives 
does not require the name of the clerk to be on the form, removal of the name should not be a problem. 
54  KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 402.080 (West 2006), requires that the license be issued by “the clerk 
of the county.” § 402.100(1)(c) suggests that this might include deputy clerks, but one might argue that 
it must be the County Clerk him or herself. Moreover, § 402.100(3)(a) requires that after the ceremony 
is performed a certificate must be delivered by the person performing the ceremony and that the 
certificate must include “the name of the county clerk under whose authority the license was issued.” 
Again, this could be interpreted to include the deputy clerk’s when the county clerk refuses to issue 
licenses or have her name on the licenses, a position with which the governor and state attorney general 
seem to agree, see supra note 52, and accompanying text, but one could argue against this interpretation 
under the statute. 
55 See Dockterman, supra note 52, and accompanying text. 
56 Id. (noting State Attorney General and Governor have approved the altered licenses as valid). 
57  RAVITCH, supra note 4. 
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licenses and could only be done if licenses issued without the name would 
remain valid. 
The fourth parameter is a matter of common sense. If the main duty of 
an official is to issue marriage licenses or perform civil ceremonies, and the 
official cannot do so based on religious objections, there could be no 
accommodation. One option in this context, at least where the official is not 
elected, would be to relocate the employee. This would be at the discretion 
of the agency and would need to be done without negatively impacting 
others. For example, as where someone else in the office wants to perform 
the objecting employee’s job and the objecting employee can be transferred 
without harming other employees. In the case of officials elected to do that 
specific duty, however, performing the duty equally for all citizens or 
stepping down are the only options allowed short of violating the 
Constitution.58 As a practical matter this may rarely come up because 
county clerks and civil magistrates often perform many functions, only one 
of which is issuing marriage licenses or performing civil marriage 
ceremonies. In these cases, parameters one and two would govern. 
The fifth parameter is both important and problematic. It is important 
due to the severity of the dignitary harm that can be fostered in situations 
where a government official seeks out media attention for the denial of 
service to citizens or where the official directly confronts the citizens in a 
disrespectful manner. As I have explained elsewhere, the mere existence of 
potential dignitary harm is not enough to deny exemptions.59 Yet, in some 
situations the dignitary harm is severe and exacerbated by the behavior of 
the government official(s) who seek religious exemptions.60 In these cases, 
as opposed to situations where a government official is accommodated and 
simply has someone else perform the duty or where the government official 
tells the citizens that he or she cannot perform the duty but will immediately 
get someone who can, the dignitary harm caused to the citizens would be 
direct and material. 
This parameter is problematic because we are dealing with issues that 
could impact freedom of speech. Here, however, the fact that we are dealing 
with government officials and employees helps answer the question. The 
Supreme Court has long drawn a distinction between government officials 
and employees speaking as private citizens on matters of public importance 
58 Cf. Miller v. Davis, Civ. Action No. 15-44-DLB, 2015 WL 4866729, at *3 (E.D. Ky. Aug. 12, 
2015) (noting that failure to issue the licenses or allow others to do so is unconstitutional). 
59  RAVITCH, supra note 4, at chs. 2–3. 
60 Cf. Douglas Nejaime & Reva B. Siegel, Conscience Wars: Complicity-Based Conscience 
Claims in Religion and Politics, 124 YALE L.J. 2516, 2574–79 (2015) (recognizing that direct 
confrontation can increase dignitary harm, but still suggesting that dignitary harm more generally must 
be addressed). 
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and speaking in their capacity as government officials or employees.61
When speaking in their capacity as government officials or employees 
speech can be limited. While government officials or employees speak as 
private citizens on matters of public concern, however, their freedom of 
speech is more carefully protected.62
Here, the very issue arises from performance of government duties so 
any speech involved would be in the actors’ capacity as government 
officials or employees. Therefore, if the government official or employee 
contacts the media to announce that he or she will not serve same-sex 
couples, or the official or employee confronts same-sex couples in a 
disrespectful way, the employee or official is speaking in his or her capacity 
as a government official or employee. Therefore, such speech can be 
limited. In this case the limitation would result in the denial of an 
accommodation because of the harm inflicted on citizens. Simply saying, “I 
cannot help you with that; I will get someone who can,” is not the sort of 
thing that would raise these concerns. 
What about the Kim Davis situation? Kim Davis did not make the 
initial contact with the media, so as an initial matter the problem was that 
she violated parameters one and two. As things progressed, however, she 
and her lawyers called additional attention to the situation. This creates a 
sort of chicken or the egg problem. Had the media not already been paying 
attention to her case perhaps this would violate parameter five, but since the 
media was already focused on the case it is a tougher call. Her direct 
contact with the couples she refused to serve, however, would violate 
parameter five. She did more than say something like, “Sorry, I can’t serve 
you, I will get someone who can.” She refused to allow anyone to serve 
these couples, and she made sure the couples knew why in no uncertain 
terms.63
This is significant because when Davis refused to issue marriage 
licenses on the basis of her religious objection to same sex marriage she 
made clear that it is because she thinks same-sex marriage is a sin, and she 
said so in her capacity as a government official. The fact that she denied 
licenses to all couples, whether same sex or not, does not change the 
analysis, because her reasons for doing so were openly and directly based 
on her objection to same sex-marriage. Moreover, she confronted same-sex 
couples, and even though she did not act viciously or in an openly mean-
61  Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983). 
62 Id.
63  Miller v. Davis, Civ. Action No. 15-44-DLB, 2015 WL 4866729 (E.D. Ky. Aug. 12, 2015); 
WKYT, Same Sex Couple Confronts Kentucky Clerk, N.Y. TIMES VIDEO (Sept. 1, 2015), 
www.nytimes.com/video/us/100000003885415/same-sex-couple-confronts-kentucky-clerk.html (Davis 
says clearly that she is denying the license based on “God’s authority.”). 
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spirited manner towards same-sex couples, she denied them the license 
because she viewed their exercise of their constitutional rights as a sin and 
openly said so. Therefore, she violated parameter five. The sort of dignitary 
harm caused by such a direct refusal and denunciation by a government 
official is different from a situation where a government official simply 
asks someone else in the office to perform a duty. 
It may be that in the latter situation the couple knows, or can easily 
figure out, the reason. As a result, they may feel some sense of dignitary 
harm, or they may simply respect the rights of the clerk and view the 
situation as part of living in a pluralistic society. As I have written 
elsewhere, such an indirect dignitary harm should not be a basis to deny a 
religious accommodation.64 When the government official directly 
confronts citizens in the manner Kim Davis did, the situation reaches a 
different level and would violate parameter five. It may also violate the 
Establishment Clause. 
CONCLUSION
Religious freedom and same-sex marriage need not conflict, even in 
contested contexts like requests for accommodation by government 
officials. Religious accommodations can and should be given where doing 
so would not delay service or lower the level of service provided same-sex 
couples. In some contexts, such as where there is only one official who can 
perform a specific function, this may mean that the official cannot be 
accommodated, because the accommodation would infringe on the 
fundamental rights of same-sex couples. 
The Kim Davis case is a bad example because she made herself almost 
impossible to accommodate without violating the rights of citizens. Yet, for 
every Kim Davis there are numerous government officials who would 
welcome accommodations such as allowing others in the office to perform 
the duties to which they object or having their name removed from forms so 
long as the forms remain valid under state law. Both of these 
accommodations rejected at one point or another by Davis. Recent laws in 
North Carolina and Utah demonstrate it is possible to accommodate 
religious freedom claims without delaying or lowering the level of service 
provided to same-sex couples. These laws are not perfect, but they provide 
excellent and workable proof of concept. 
64  RAVITCH, supra note 4. 
